Global Salafist Jihad in UK
The monograph analyses the origins of the use of violence in the name of religion by the Salafist movement in Europe in order to enable identification of key characteristics to shape national strategies of prevention that are appropriate for tackling the root causes of Islamist violence that threatens UK national interests. The study shows how the interplay between the social, political and militant elements of the movement have given rise to the jihadist faction whose spread to the UK has been the result both of economic migration and as a response to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Historical analysis demonstrates how the Muslim population in Europe has developed a separate identity from that of its adopted states and identifies three strands of radical Suuni Islamist thought and practice that challenge the West. Analysis points up a range of individual motivations to radical actions for which there is some pattern but an insufficiently consistent profile to offer opportunities for proactive targeting, and a broad strategic logic based on the cost effectiveness of the suicide technique when linked to religious or political goals. In framing strategies government should therefore be less concerned with general deprivation or individual pathologies than with the broader scope of individual motivations, the strategic logic of group action and the need to empower more moderate, purist elements at the expense of the jihadists. The principles of contemporary counterinsurgency thinking are applied to the characterisation already developed to formulate policies that are based upon isolating terrorists from their ideological, psychological and physical support while terrorist supporters are integrated back into the broader community. Recognition is given to the domestic impact of world events that flow from globalisation and the need to reframe foreign policies that take account of this mirror effect on the electorate. Immigration policies are identified asThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team
The National Guard Bureau, following the publication of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, and the 1998 Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction, created the Military Support Detachment-Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (MSD-RAID) team to assist in the consequence management of incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The mission of the MSD-RAID, recently renamed the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (WMD-CST), is to assess a suspected nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological event in support of a local incident commander; advise civilian responders regarding appropriate action; and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite the arrival of additional state and federal assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. The National Guard has fielded twenty-seven of these teams and eventually plans to establish one in every state and territory. The fact that the WMD-CST program is still in its infancy presents the Department of Defense with a tremendous opportunity to modify the structure or mission of these teams, if necessary, before they are fully fielded to every state and territory. It is appropriate to evaluate whether or not these teams, initially fielded in 1998, satisfy a strategic necessity. They must be assessed as to whether or not they accomplish the objectives outlined in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation. Their structure, mission, and capabilities must be analyzed to determine if they are able to successfully mitigate the consequences of a WMD incident. More important, however, is whether or not the contemporary threat environment warrants their existence. While the WMD-CST does enhance the National Guard's response capability, its mission and structure do not completely satisfy the strategic need that prompted its creation. The team's four-hour respoThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Conflict for Resources
This monograph discusses the propensity for conflict surrounding the diminishing water in Lake Chad. The shortage of water in the lake and its basin threatens regional economic development and the existence of the population in the area. The paper uses a comparative case study to determine the extent that states conflict over scarce natural resources. The first case study examines the dispute over possession of the Spratly Islands located in the South China Sea. The Spratly Islands and the South China Sea may possess significant oil and natural gas deposits. The island chain is also claimed by multiple states with interstate conflict between China and Vietnam over legitimate possession. The second case study examines the potential for conflict within the Lake Chad Basin. Lake Chad lies within four African states, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad. These riparian states require water from the lake to support the population's drinking, agriculture, livestock and sanitation. Since 1960, Lake Chad's water has receded. Population increases, climate change, desertification, regional conflict and manmade water catchment projects compound the regional shortage of water.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Seizing the Strategic Communication Initiative
The United States military has conducted counterinsurgency campaigns against violent Islamic extremists for the last eight years and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. However, communication-minded, technology-savvy, insurgencies have generally outperformed the military in strategic communication. The U.S. military generally conducts strategic communication in counterinsurgency operations from a culture of reticence that ensures that communication and information operations are ineffective and reactive in nature. Counterinsurgent forces should adopt a culture of engagement in order to seize the strategic communication initiative from the insurgent and increase operational effectiveness. Colombia provides a clear example of a counterinsurgent that has seized the strategic communication initiative from the FARC by successfully adopting a culture of engagement that is proactive, leader-driven, innovative, adaptive, and sustainable. Despite making significant progress in recent years in adapting to the operational environment and moving towards a culture of engagement, these changes are not yet holistic and have not allowed the military to seize the initiative in strategic communication.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Medical Diplomacy
The United States Air Force Chief of Staff advocated the tenets of the Outside the Continental United States Humanitarian Relief Operations (HUMRO) Operational Capabilities Package concept document to all combatant commanders in December 2006. The author critiques the disaster relief model on the premise that the concept document creates unrealistic combatant commander expectations of the HUMRO's employment capabilities. Unrealistic asset employment expectations can adversely impact medical diplomacy efforts aimed at furthering theater security cooperation objectives. The research methodology comprises a literature review of military doctrine and international humanitarian assistance principles, complemented by an analysis of recent military relief operations.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
From Mission Creep to Smart Power
The size of the Defense Department both in terms of financial resources and personnel resources dwarfs the State Department. This unevenness has caused the Defense Department to pick up new missions that traditionally belong to the State Department. The negative consequences go beyond simply high operational tempo. There are also the international perceptions of U.S. military in uniform performing diplomatic functions.American servicemen and women can be trained to accomplish any task, but they will never take off their uniform. The camouflage on the uniform will always evoke sentiments of defense, security and force when needed. When security is assured and the mission shifts to development, training and diplomacy, the U.S. urgently needs a robust State Department fully able to seamlessly step in where the military left off. Currently, this capability does not fully exist. This paper examines where resources and missions can be shifted. Where changes make sense one next has to look at the likelihood that proposals will be politically, practically and economically viable. The second half of the paper examines both the inside and outside players that have influence impacting these proposals and departments. This paper used all available resources that were available as of December 2010.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Asymmetric Warfare
Description: The morning of September 11, 2001 changed the face of America. Terrorism is no longer a word reserved for television broadcasters when describing events taking place halfway around the world. Watching the smoke billowing into the clear blue skies that September day Americans knew that we were on longer safe at home or at work. Terrorism had come to America. This abstract idea of killing innocent people which has always been associated with places with names like Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and Columbia was not just knocking at our door it had kicked it in taking thousands of people along with it. As we sat glued to our television sets, the fact that terrorists were no longer a foreign problem was repeated over and over by commentators and we watched the safety of our nation burn and fall as the buildings collapsed into a pile of rubble. When the first plane hit the World Trade Center most of us assumed it was a tragic accident. Something terrible must have gone wrong. The plane must have veered off course due to a mechanical failure or pilot error, but when a second plane rammed the second tower right before our eyes, it was clear this was no accident. A choreographed terrorist attack on the United States was underway and we were helpless to stop it. The vulnerabilities of America became clear to the world in those few moments. As the smoke cleared and the rubble was cleaned up, it would be naive to think this was the last asymmetric attack that terrorists will inflict on America. We need to ask hard questions and be ready to make hard changes so we can maintain the very freedoms we hold so dear. How did these terrorists cause so much death and destruction within our borders? What made these buildings the targets of choice? In addition, could we have prevented it? The answer to the fist two are simple, they watched how we live in this land of the free and discovered our weaknesses.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America
The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) transnational criminal/terrorist franchises in Latin America operating under broad state protection now pose a tier-one security threat for the United States. Similar hybrid franchise models are developing in other parts of the world, which makes the understanding of these new dynamics an important factor in a broader national security context. This threat goes well beyond the traditional nonstate theory of constraints activity, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, into the potential for trafficking related to weapons of mass destruction by designated terrorist organizations and their sponsors. These activities are carried out with the support of regional and extra-regional state actors whose leadership is deeply enmeshed in criminal activity, which yields billions of dollars in illicit revenues every year. These same leaders have a publicly articulated, common doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate the use of weapons of mass destruction. The central binding element in this alliance is a hatred for the West, particularly the United States, and deep anti-Semitism, based on a shared view that the 1979 Iranian Revolution was a transformative historical event. For Islamists, it is evidence of divine favor; and for Bolivarians, a model of a successful asymmetrical strategy to defeat the "Empire." The primary architect of this theology/ideology that merges radical Islam and radical, anti-Western populism and revolutionary zeal is the convicted terrorist Ilich S獺nchez Ramirez, better known as "Carlos the Jackal," whom Ch獺vez has called a true visionary.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Core Competencies for the Royal New Zealand Air Force
Carl Builder's Icarus Syndrome raises several issues that he believes have significantly detracted from the effectiveness of the USAF as an institutional body. Although not in direct response to his concerns, the USAF has attempted to regain its sense of vision and purpose. Part of that effort has resulted in the formulation of six core competencies. These core competencies tie together aspects of theory and doctrine as well as mission and vision. The core competencies (it is hoped) are very relevant to the present and future USAF, but they are less applicable to other nation's air forces. I propose to study how the six USAF core competencies may be applied (intact or modified) to the RNZAF.The Royal New Zealand Air Force, I believe, is in a similar position to that described by Carl Builder. A Defence Policy Paper has just been published by the New Zealand Government. The RNZAF could well benefit from some of the research that has produced the six core competencies for the USAF, although the results will most likely be quite different. I would like to propose some core competencies for the RNZAF in my project.My research project would thus consist of several parts: trace the evolution of the six core competencies in the USAF, analyse the RNZAF's strategic policy environment and then derive core competencies for that service.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986 was the most sweeping legislation related to the Department of Defense (DoD) organizational reform after World War II. With an overarching objective of enhancing "jointness", unifying the direction of the armed forces under joint doctrine and policies for the employmentof multi-service military forces, throughout the DoD, the practical purpose was to improve warfighting capabilities. This legislation was based upon implicit assumptions about threats and organizational needs which many feel have since changed. This report focuses on the joint officer personnel management aspects ofthe GNA legislation and on how officer personnel management has evolved as aresult of the mandates of the Act. As currently administered, DoD predicts that it is nearing a time of reporting non-compliance with certain provisions of the law. In addition, DoD finds that the law prevents the recording of some significant joint experiences for certain officers, and that the law prevents the utilization of technological advances in distributive and distance learning in association with joint professional military education. The report offers options for congressional consideration which would continue the status quo, would allow for changes in the law to maintain the progress in joint officer management which was originally envisioned, or would allow for additional study. This report will not be updated.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Performance Management and the Intelligence Community
Mandated performance management for the intelligence community requires revisiting. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) mandated performance management system for DoD Intelligence Community (IC) members can be a useful management tool and applicable to IC organizations when; performance can be verified, implementation is executed properly, and outcomes are well defined and continuously evaluated for efficacy. The applicability of performance management (PM) to the IC is contentious and PM should not have been applied indiscriminately throughout the IC. Organizations and personnel performing missions where performance can be verified, such as scientific and technical intelligence, will benefit from PM. However, the method of implementation within the IC since its inception in March 2007 has been deficient. PM has been indiscriminately applied to organizations where performance cannot possibly be verified. Also, PM systems, developed by outside consultants, have been mandated from above with limited or no involvement from organizations and personnel that perform the mission and who would be most knowledge in the development of performance measures and outcomes. Additionally, a true merit-based compensation system, like the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), has not been implemented.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Israeli Intelligence
This thesis uses the Israeli intelligence community's 60-year struggle to combat terrorism to identify lessons the United States can learn from as it develops and matures its own counterterrorism policy and strategy. It highlights several counterterrorism examples in Israel's recent history and examines the role intelligence played in their success or failure. Additionally, this paper looks at intelligence reforms various investigative bodies in Israel have recommended since the late 1990s to combat terrorism. From these examples and others, Israeli intelligence has brought to light many lessons learned for combating terrorism. This study identifies four. First, because of the flexibility terrorist groups enjoy, the intelligence enterprise must be designed with inherent flexibility and adaptability in order to combat this threat. Second, while human intelligence (HUMINT) is seen as increasingly important in countering terrorism, a balance must be struck between reliance on traditional intelligence disciplines and collection methods, such as HUMINT, and high-technology means. Both are essential and more effective when used in concert with each other. Third, decision makers can benefit from policy advice from the Intelligence Community. It is extremely important, however, that each understand its role with clear delineations of responsibility established, understood, and followed. Last, with respect to counterterrorism intelligence, the Intelligence Community must not silence alternative views. Dissenting opinions are essential when fighting an elusive threat that is as difficult to understand as terrorism.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Combating Terrorism in Southeast Asia
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) after the 9/11 attacks, we have learned that Al-Qaeda linked and inspired radical Islamic terrorist organizations are operating throughout the world as part of a connected global insurgency. This insurgency emerged in Southeast Asia in a horrifying and undisputed way in October 2002 with a deadly bombing in Bali, Indonesia leaving over 200 dead and over 200 others injured. Since then, several Southeast Asia countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines have wrestled with this challenge and have taken various measures to eliminate radical Islamic terrorism using lessons from years of counterinsurgency activities. This paper attempts to identify areas where the U.S. can expand its contributions in fighting this global insurgency, focusing primarily on Southeast Asia efforts and using lessons from past Southeast Asia counterinsurgency operations. Although the focus is combating radical Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia, this paper also addresses implications for combating terrorism throughout the world using the Southeast Asia model.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Foreign Military Sales Policy of the Kennedy Presidential Administration
Since the "Truman Doctrine" was enunciated in 1947, the United States has pursued its foreign policy objectives using various forms of economic and military assistance. With the majority of this assistance aimed at containing communist expansionism, the United States' allies became increasingly dependent upon large amounts of grant military assistance. As President John F. Kennedy assumed office the economic burden of this grant assistance came under increasing scrutiny. This study analyzes the role of the Kennedy administration in the evolution of military assistance from grants to sales. An in-depth literature review focusing on historical reviews of this topic, and congressional testimony regarding the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was conducted to trace the development of military sales policy during this period. An examination of Kennedy administration actions with regard to Cold War nuclear policy, Latin American challenges, instability in Southeast Asia, and the influence of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, indicates a policy shift in the method used to deliver military assistance. These policies, and the actions of McNamara indicate an increasing reliance upon foreign military sales as the primary mode of supplying military assistance.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Organizing NORTHCOM for Success
A Theater Special Operations Command (SOC), a sub-unified command, advises combatant commanders on the capabilities of Special Operations Forces (SOF), provides SOF for employment, and integrates SOF fully into theater plans by planning, coordinating, conducting, and supporting the geographical unified commander. The SOC is a trained and resourced rapid deployment joint task force headquarters, if needed. The new unified command, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), attained "initial operations capability (IOC)" on October 1, 2002. NORTHCOM is not organized for success to accomplish its new mission of homeland defense and civil support. NORTHCOM must transform to an organization that can anticipate and adapt to its new missions. By analyzing the planning, command and control, and coordination of SOF support during Hurricane Andrew and the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, it was determined that a SOC would be a critical component to this new organization. The SOC will be vital during both deliberate and crisis action planning, advising on the best method to integrate SOF capabilities. Early planning efforts by SOCOM for SOF support to JTF-Olympics determined only a small JSOTF was needed to coordinate with the lead federal agency for counterterrorism, the FBI. In contrast, JTF-Andrew did not have a Special Operations Coordination element and had to learn the capabilities and limitations of SOF before being able to employ them effectively for the disaster relief efforts. This was a problem in the time-sensitive environment of a massive hurricane recovery operation. SOCNORTH would ensure SOF are integrated into any operational plan, so they can assist NORTHCOM responses to any future homeland crises.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
The Ring of Gyges
The paper looks at the relevance of deterrence strategies against individuals in the 2035 timeframe. It recommends a new model to analyze what types of actions may be used to deter individuals and which strategies might be effective.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
An Air Force for the Long War and Beyond
The Long War and the post-Cold War world in general demand that the U.S. military improve its ability to conduct effective Counterinsurgency; Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction; and Humanitarian Assistance. In practice, these operations have common elements and are closely related. This paper refers to them collectively as Extraordinary Operations (EO). Air forces bring vital capabilities to EO, but the U.S. Air Force has historically neglected their cultivation because EO requires fundamentally different ways of thinking, different skill sets, and different equipment - making them nearly antithetical to conventional operations. EO and building partner capacity (BPC) are fundamental elements of our strategy to win the Long War, but EO is so different from conventional operations and so historically vulnerable to neglect that the USAF should consider establishing an organization dedicated to EO that is focused on BPC. This paper presents an organizational concept for a Partnership Numbered Air Force and argues that it would meet national strategic guidance; assure proper professional development; improve EO skill, theory, doctrine and equipment; encourage better cooperation with other U.S. government agencies, IGOs and NGOs; provide better response to domestic emergencies; and would provide national leaders and combatant commanders with low-risk, high-payoff engagement options. Such an organization would be the Air Force's most effective weapon in the Long War and beyond.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Weaponizing Space
Throughout history, states have exploited technology to attain and retain their national security using the military instrument of power. Precision munitions, stealth technology, robust command and control architectures, it is believed space weapon systems are next in line to be developed and deployed as a capability to provide a state the competitive edge in warfare. Because of its significant space investment to enable its asymmetric military and economic capabilities, the US has a vital interest to defend its space assets. Because of US dependencies in space, the author believes it will be the first state to deploy an operational space weapon. While one of the intentions of the US will be to deter future adversaries from developing and deploying space weapons, a "Pandora's Box" will be opened and a unique form of arms race will ensue. Research for this paper was conducted using open source articles, journals, doctrine, policy and other open sources to analyze the issue of space weapons, with a focus in the area of policy. This paper explores the complex issue of space weapons, to include analyzing the definition of a space weapon as well as the potential benefits and problems of deploying such a weapon. Additionally, this paper will investigate US historical and current policies relative to space weapons and analyze how US policy is likely to evolve in the near future. Lastly, because of the importance of how the international community construes US policy, this paper will examine international concerns and reactions relative to the issue of weaponizing space.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Combatting Terrorism and Measuring the Results
Four and a half years after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the US continues to fight the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) with efforts both at home and abroad. "Are we winning the war?" is a question often raised to political and military figures in discussions about the GWOT. The answer to the question depends upon the measures of effectiveness one uses to gauge the progress of the war. Depending on one's viewpoint and measurement criteria, perceptions on if we are winning or not can be skewed to favor whichever argument one puts forth. Measuring effectiveness in the GWOT is difficult, yet critical. There is no distinct set of values to measure the progress in the fight against terrorism however in order to develop strategies to better address the issue, one must in fact be able to assess the current level of success.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Sharpening The Needle
In order to prepare for future urban operations, the USAF must place Non-Lethal Weapon (NLW) development in the forefront of its research programs and match them to Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The world population continues to grow and an ever-increasing percentage is moving to the cities to find sustenance and employment. America's enemies have discovered how to anchor an otherwise superior force in the urban quagmire, where a single instance of Collateral Damage (CD) can have strategic effects. These two factors will converge in the future and place the US at a significant disadvantage unless the USAF prepares now. Non-lethal technology can avoid massive structural damage and civilian deaths during urban combat by giving commanders options in situations where employing lethal technology would be inappropriate. The Active Denial System (ADS), Infrasound generator, and High-Power Microwave (HPM) are different types of electro-magnetic NLW that can easily be matched to UAS. The UAS has the unique advantages of persistence, expendability, and low cost compared to manned aircraft. Future adversaries will no doubt continue to recognize the asymmetric advantage of urban combat when facing the US. NLW-equipped air power can provide crucial support to joint forces across the entire spectrum of urban warfare, from peacekeeping to major combat operations. NLW-equipped aircraft could mean the difference between success and failure for the US in future joint urban operations.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Department of Defense Energy Strategy
The United States has a National Security problem, energy security, in which the Department of Defense has a unique interest. The United States imports 26% of its total energy supply and 56% of the oil it consumes. The DOD is the largest single consumer of energy in the United States and energy is the key enabler of US military combat power. Huge energy consumption, increased competition for limited energy supplies, ever increasing energy costs, and no comprehensive Energy Strategy or oversight of energy issues in the DOD have created vulnerabilities. These include potential fuel and electricity supply disruptions as well as foreign policy and economic vulnerability. The DOD needs a comprehensive Energy Strategy and organizational structure to implement a strategy to improve National Security by decreasing US dependence on foreign oil, ensure access to critical energy requirements, maintain or improve combat capability, promote research for future energy security, be fiscally responsible to the American tax payer, and protect the environment. This strategy can be implemented through leadership and culture change, innovation and process efficiencies, reduced demand, and increased/ diversified energy sources.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Converting the JNEM Training Aid to a Forecasting Tool
The Joint Non-Kinetic Effects Model (JNEM) is a computer based simulation for training Division and Corps Commanders and Staffs in a manner that accurately replicates the complexities of interacting with civilian populations. The model replicates many of the dynamics that can affect the 'mood' for a given population along four different axis: Safety, Autonomy, Quality of Life, and Culture. The model replicates the myriad interactions that occur between population groups, enemy groups, and Coalition forces. By paying attention to these dynamics, the training audience can gain considerable insight and enjoy a much richer training experience prior to employing those skills in real life situations. This monograph poses the question that if the model is considered accurate, such that inputs by the training audience generate accurate and reasonable outputs in the form of population reactions, then could the model be modified in order to serve as a forecasting tool for Campaign Designers. Similar to a weather model, which is updated on a daily basis, could JNEM take 'real-world' inputs and generate reasonably accurate forecasts for a population's mood? This would not be an effort to predict the actions of a particular individual, but an effort to give indications and warning that a particular area was headed for trouble. Beginning with an introduction to Chaos and Complexity theories, the monograph examines the JNEM model for the potential to convert it from a training aid to a forecasting tool. The monograph concludes that JNEM, while structurally sound, isn't suited as a forecasting tool for the following reasons: its use as a training aid, the use of implicit versus explicit assumptions regarding causation, the use of arbitrary values, the use (or lack thereof) of feedback to refine equations, and the concept of emergence.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Countering Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Their Ideologies
While all warfare is an expression of politics, none is more pervasively so than irregular conflict. The irregular side, most probably employing a mixture of guerilla tactics and terrorism, will seek favorable political effect from several courses of action. Combating terrorism has become a global effort. Counterterrorism is a struggle of political wills, waged preeminently by the police and other security services, with the military acting in reserve. The most important weapon for the counter-terrorist is information. The war of ideas is crucial to today's terrorist, guerilla, and insurgent. Two of major terrorist organizations that pose the greatest potential threat to the United States are Al Qaeda and Hezbollah; both are motivated by two very powerful yet distinct ideologies. Al Qaeda and Hezbollah may not share the same ideology, but ideology is a key component of why these groups undertake violent action. An ideology is a framework of ideas that describes a view of reality and a set of social and political actions that should be undertaken to change and improve the situation of a particular group. To succeed the insurgent or terrorist must win the war of ideas; the counter-terrorism forces cannot allow this to happen. Ideologies are thus difficult to combat using military forces, because ideas are extremely difficult to contain or destroy. Both Al Qaeda and Hezbollah thrive in the absence or weakness of governments and often operate in ungoverned regions, taking advantage of weak national control to smuggle weapons, money, and other resources. Unable to compete in a direct confrontation with regular, host nation forces, these groups use asymmetric tactics such as terrorism to engage their enemies and further their ideologies. This paper furthers the understanding of disparate insurgencies through a comparative analysis of Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. The main goal is to show that the crucial divergence between Hezbollah and Al Qaeda allows for differing opportunitThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
A Shared Common Operational Picture in the Fight Against Terror and Organized Crime
Transnational terrorist organizations and organized crime groups are both considered national security threats to the United States. While the fight against organized crime has been underway for over a hundred years, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is relatively new, emerging just over five years ago. Both fights, however, are against thinking enemies who continuously adapt and evolve their tactics, techniques, and procedures.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
PMESII and the Non-State Actor
A systems perspective is beginning to permeate doctrine. This perspective calls for an analysis of the key systems of an adversary. PMESII is an acronym that stands for political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems. Analyzing the adversary's PMESII systems can lead to the identification of key nodes, links, and vulnerabilities, which can then be targeted kinetically or non-kinetically to achieve desired effects. The PMESII systems construct applies well when the adversary is a state. All of these systems will be present, and mature, with many of them possessing tangible infrastructure, which can easily be identified by Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and then targeted with precision weaponry. However, when the adversary is non-state actor, these same systems will be noticeably missing. Non-state actors are organized fundamentally different than states, and manifest themselves in completely different ways. The utility of the PMESII construct is significantly diminished when the adversary is a non-state actor. To apply the systems perspective to non-state actors, such as Al-Zarqawi, the Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, a different construct is required. The author maintains that identifying the critical requirements of non-state actors leads to a more relevant construct. The author, using the nonstate actor Zarqawi, identifies four systems that the typical non-state actor requires to remain viable. These systems are funding, recruitment, information and support, or (FRIS). The FRIS construct provides the same level of utility for the non-state actor, as PMESII does for states. The author recommends incorporating the FRIS construct as a corollary to the PMESII construct in the doctrinal manuals and publications that discuss the systems perspective.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
The Commander's Emergency Response Program
Immediately following major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom, commanders were faced with the Herculean task of stabilizing a war-torn country whose people and infrastructure had suffered from years of debilitating sanctions and neglect. Regrettably, commanders lacked the means to address the vast humanitarian issues confronting them. Fortunately, the large sums of currency captured on the battlefield provided commanders the means to begin to restore essential services to quell what was becoming increasing unrest. This initial program formed the foundation for what is now known as the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) that has proven to be an invaluable non-kinetic tool in both Iraq and Afghanistan.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Officer Development
Army senior leaders suggest that to face the challenges of the Contemporary Operating Environment, the US Army requires a new type of officer. This multi-skilled leader, dubbed the 'pentathlete';, will meet the challenges of the modern battlefield as a function of his maturity, experience, education, and formal training. US Army officers today, however, face a career path marked by "up or out" promotions, short tours leading and commanding soldiers, and few opportunities to seek advanced degrees in residence. Officers weather the other second and third order effects of an outdated 20-year retirement plan that does not optimize the resources dedicated to building a highly effective officer corps. When prompted to change, the US Army often looks to its own history for inspiration. Rather than take a traditional approach, the author conducted a study of army officer development among America's five closest allies. The armies of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and Great Britain all exhibit common developmental themes and all strongly diverge from the current US model. The result of this study, an allied-inspired model for US Army officer development, may provide some suggestions for the US Army in their effort to create pentathlete officers.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Should the Department of Defense (DoD) Establish a Unified Logistics Command (USLOGCOM)?
This monograph asserts that DoD should establish a Unified Combatant Command (COCOM)-level USLOGCOM. DoD should begin a deliberate 10-20 year process to establish a USLOGCOM. As an intermediate and immediate step, DoD should make the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) an operational subordinate command of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The monograph also makes additional recommendations that work toward an eventual USLOGCOM, including returning the Defense Contract Management Agency to DLA control and placing additional feeding and fueling functions in theater under DLA's control. The monograph relies on the large volume of existing work to arrive at the above recommendation. There is a clear majority of work calling for increased centralization of strategic logistics authorities. These previous studies were done by a wide variety of respected organizations including the Government Accountability Office, the Defense Science Board (DSB), the RAND Corporation, and monographs by graduate students. The DSB points out that recommendations for consolidation are consistent with their 1996, 1998, and 2001 studies on logistics transformation. The report pointedly asks, since these recommendations and the recommendations of other groups are consistent and not new, "Why has none of this been done before?" In an attempt to answer this question, they offer four possible explanations. First, stakeholders have felt no compelling reason (similar to a profit and loss statement in the private sector) to change to a more efficient organizational construct. Second, driven by risk avoidance and diffusion of authority in the logistics systems, decision times are too long. Third, the system is designed to focus on resource allocations principally to the Services rather than to mission priorities. Finally, the report states there is little incentive to use effective metrics to monitor resource utilization and then there is little, if any, consequence for not meeting or even settingThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
INSS China Strategic Perspectives 2
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Strategic PSYOP
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) is a cornerstone of the United States'; Information Operations and is a combat multiplier. As defined by Joint Doctrine, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. A Strategic PSYOP organization is necessary to breach the gap between diplomatic and political statements and actions and those statements and actions by military organizations. To be effective, PSYOP must operate in, with and amongst the national leadership and governmental organizations. Current operations in the Global War on Terror focus on the need to coordinate, integrate and conduct Psychological Operations at the strategic level. Throughout the 20th century, PSYOP has been a strategic enabler, enabling military and civilian forces to focus their efforts. PSYOP's importance has increased and decreased throughout the latter part of the century. The galvanizing events of September 11, 2001 bought a new focus to PSYOP and strategic information coordination. A Strategic PSYOP Unit will provide the focal point to coordinate various governmental organizations and national leadership directives into a cohesive, integrated PSYOP program. The majority of PSYOP expertise resides within that Army; however, manning a strategic PSYOP organization must be a joint endeavor. This provides for full participation from the Services, incorporating their unique capabilities. A joint strategic PSYOP organization will take time to implement, as the required skills and experiences must be grown throughout the Services. Ultimately, a Joint Strategic Psychological Operations Unit will provide the coordination and knowledge support required to the interagency and national leadership.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Focusing Arctic Policy
Rising global temperatures are contributing to unprecedented recession of Arctic sea ice. This environment is providing new opportunities for Arctic development and, more importantly, access to Arctic sea lanes that were previously of limited utility. As Arctic waterways open, the U.S. must ensure full access to these global commons in order to bolster its own economic prosperity and support the global economic system. Disputes over appropriate use of Arctic resources and waterways are most likely to erupt between the three major Arctic powers ? the United States, Canada and Russia. Canada and Russia have made excessive claims in Arctic waters, designating the Northwest and Northeast Passages as sovereign areas. In order to delegitimize these claims and protect its Arctic interests, the U.S. must take coordinated diplomatic, economic, and military action. First, the U.S. should develop an interagency office for Arctic issues to coordinate its Arctic policy and implement actions directed by National Security Policy Directive 66. It should take a measured approach to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, understanding its impacts on U.S. Arctic and global interests. It should strengthen the Arctic regime by participating fully in the Arctic Council while investigating other institutional options for issues beyond the Council's charter. Economically, the U.S. should research deep water port options in Alaska, cooperate on development of Canadian and Russian ports, and investigate joint development of icebreaking vessels. Militarily, it should develop SAR capabilities and bases with Canada and Russia, and improve military to military contact.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Failing States in the Horn of Africa and the Impact on the Global War on Terrorism
On 7 August 1998, Al Qaeda attacked almost simultaneously U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania killing 258 people and wounding over 5000. The U.S. indicted twenty-two individuals for the bombings including four Kenyans and two Tanzanians. 1 On 12 October 2000 the USS Cole was attacked in the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventeen sailors were killed and thirty-nine wounded.2 In March 2007, US District Court Judge Robert Doumar ruled that Al Qaeda (AQ) could not have carried out the USS Cole attack without official Sudanese support.3 While many might argue about the finer details of these attacks, there is no doubt that the terrorists behind the embassy bombings and the attack on the USS Cole recruited, planned, and trained from within the Horn of Africa.4 Perhaps the clearest reason why this area is fertile ground for terrorism is rooted in the region's instability.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Rescue Operations Center
The recovery of isolated American and allied personnel remains a priority for all commanders. The joint force commander designates the command-and-control of his rescue forces. The delegation during major combat operations is normally to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). However, this delegation can be made outside of the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) for missions short of major combat operations. These missions include humanitarian and disaster relief operations, non-combat evacuation operations, defense support to civil authorities, and irregular warfare. The best method of decentralizing control is through the Rescue Operations Center (ROC). Rescue forces would use the ROC to control PR operations in a decentralized manner across the spectrum of military operations.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
The Best Defense
This paper argues that minimum deterrence is a viable policy option for the United States. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review has laid the groundwork for a reduction in size of the US nuclear arsenal while at the same time, constrained economic resources promise to force the Department of Defense look for responsible ways to reduce its budget. Given this situation, the question must be asked as to whether the United States can achieve effective nuclear deterrence with a limited number of weapons. This paper argues that it can. A careful study of the nuclear weapons programs of China, India and Pakistan three countries that espouse minimum deterrence policies supports the theory that statesmen are not sensitive to the number of nuclear weapons a rival state possesses, they are sensitive to the fact that they have them at all. So long as a state possesses an overt nuclear weapons program and the capability to deliver an assured second-strike, deterrence is successfully achieved with a limited number of weapons. Minimum deterrence is, therefore, not only a viable policy for the United States to pursue, given future economic constraints it is also the most prudent.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Aerospace Policy Integration
How will limited budgets affect the future exploitation of air and space? This question is extremely relevant to Air Force planners today. Some are now suggesting the integration of existing air and space policy, in an effort to maximize limited resources. This paper seeks answers to these questions through analysis of each public policy, offering three effects integrated policy may have on future Air Force operations. Public policy is all about what you can do for citizens. Determining the probable success of policies is not easy, given our political system, and the difficulty in capturing costs and assigning values to perceived benefits. For these reasons, this paper uses political science based administrative and values analysis tools to extrapolate success. The analysis of national air policy found it highly effective. The second analysis, an extrapolation of expected results for space policy, uncovered a lower chance for success. This was based on a comparison of the two case studies, which highlighted resource availability as an important success determinant. This formed the basis of arguments for integrated policy, and all subsequent doctrine recommendations The research supports arguments for adopting an integrated policy, and provides the rationale for three changes to Air Force doctrine, roles and missions; transfer of the responsibility for close air support, reevaluation of space launch support activities, and modification of the requirements for base operability and defense. Divestiture of these functions better focuses the Air Force on its unique core competencies in the future.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Military Deployments as a Respite From Burnout
To explore the possible respite effects of deployments, active duty Air Force acquisition support personnel who were either scheduled to deploy (n = 74), or recently returned from deployment (n = 34) were surveyed. Analysis of variance compared the pre-deployment male's and female's perceived levels of burnout, emotional exhaustion, role ambiguity, role conflict, self-efficacy, organizational commitment, contingent rewards, operating conditions, co-worker satisfaction, and overall job satisfaction. The same analysis was conducted dividing the pre- and post-deployment groups by whether or not they had children. Several statistically significance findings resulted. Specifically, post-deployment females reported lower scores for emotional exhaustion, role ambiguity, organizational commitment, and overall job satisfaction. Both pre- and post-deployment members with children reported lower levels of contingent rewards. Additionally, pre-deployment members with children reported higher levels of co-worker satisfaction, and lower levels of self-efficacy. Implications of the findings are discussed.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Sustaining the Air Commons
This chapter will discuss the nature of the air commons and how it is governed and defended. It will then explore developments that may challenge the sustained openness and stability of the air commons in peacetime and emerging challenges to America's ability to control the air during wartime. In conclusion, it will recommend steps to modernize and expand access to the air commons, strengthen the international architecture that governs it, and reinforce the United States' command of the air commons.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Standing Joint Force Headquarters
The Standing Joint Force Headquarters provides a planning multiplier by bringing both joint and regional expertise to the Joint Task Force Headquarters increasing its capabilities. These capabilities assist in the rapid establishment of a fully functional Joint Task Force Headquarters allowing for quicker reaction and crisis action planning. Still the Standing Joint Force Headquarters must overcome certain inherent vulnerabilities that may inhibit the successful integration of the two headquarters elements in becoming a cohesive planning headquarters. This monograph described the historical events and policy that led to the requirement by the Secretary of Defense for each Regional Combatant Command to establish a Standing Joint Force Headquarters. It examined the model presented by Joint Forces Command for the organization and responsibilities of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Along with its structure examined the methods of employment the Standing Joint Force Headquarters could use to respond to crises throughout the world. It focused this paper on the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters into an existing headquarters, the Army Operational Headquarters. In addition, it outlined the organizational structure of the newly transformed Army Operational Headquarters. It discussed differences between the Standing Joint Force Headquarters at different Regional Combatant Commands. This led to an analysis of the capabilities the Standing Joint Force Headquarters brings to the Joint Task Force Headquarters in support of the Army Operational Headquarters. Therefore, it concluded that the Standing Joint Force Headquarters contains capabilities that are beneficial to the establishment of a Joint Task Force Headquarters. The joint and regional expertise brought by the Standing Joint Force Headquarters allows for a more rapid establishment of a cohesive and functioning Joint Task Force Headquarters.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Primary Motivators of Suicide Terrorism
After September 11th 2001, the United States (US) has come to regard terrorism, specifically catastrophic terrorism, as one of the gravest threats to its national security. In particular, the threat from terrorism involves the use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or attacks that generate mass casualties, enormous economic damage, catastrophic psychological effects, or some combination thereof. From 1980 to 2003, suicide terrorists conducted only three percent of all terrorist attacks yet they caused more than forty-eight percent of the casualties.2 The particular case of suicide terrorism deserves extra attention due to its demonstrated lethality and targeting accuracy. Thus, this paper focuses on the primary motivators of suicide terrorism because of the expectation that terrorist groups will most likely carry out catastrophic events through the use of suicide attacks.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Close Air Support for Counterinsurgency
This research paper will explore the best aircraft design features for close air support (CAS) for counterinsurgencies (COIN), particularly with respect to the current COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is nostalgia for simple, small, low, slow aircraft for COIN operations. Books and movies such as "Flight of the Intruder"1 and "Saving Private Ryan"2 have popularized the notion of A-1 Skyraiders or P-51 Mustangs swooping in at the last moment, guns blazing and dropping bombs or napalm to save American soldiers just in the nick of time. The A-10 Thunderbolt II is a favorite among ground troops for its tank-killing 30mm Gatling gun and the ability to turn tightly directly above troops. Recent papers have proposed basing a future USAF COIN aircraft on a crop duster3 and the T-6A Texan II.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Stability Operations
The Department of Defense emphasis on stability operations caused the United States Army to change its operational concept to Full Spectrum Operations (FSO). The acknowledgment of the importance of stability operations however, does not translate to the ability to plan such operations. As a result, the army has revised its doctrine to meet the demands incurred since embarking on the Global War on Terrorism in 2001. These revisions were necessary and relevant to secure the lessons of eight years of war. However, doctrinal revisions failed to provide a complete theoretical foundation for ill-structured problems as described in FM 5-0, The Operations Process; nor did the revisions do more than provide examples of stakeholders much less provide a definition of such actors; and, while key leader engagements are common practice in Iraq and Afghanistan, doctrine has not provided any tools for structuring these engagements to assist in developing understanding of ill-structured problems, or how to gain consensus among divergent groups of stakeholders. Thus, this monograph outlines three methods for inclusion in future revisions of doctrine to improve the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) specifically for stability operations.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Don't Ask, Don't Tell
Homosexuals (to include bisexuals) are currently serving their country as members of the United States military. The existence of homosexuals in the military is not a new reality and the acceptance level of their military service has shifted over the years in an increasingly positive manner. An indicator of this acceptance level has been the government's policy for homosexuals in the military. The current policy enacted by President Clinton in 1993 opened the door for homosexuals to serve in the military on the condition that they refrain from revealing their homosexuality. The policy, commonly referred to as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," was a compromise between President Clinton's desire to lift the ban entirely and end homosexual discrimination, and concerns by members of Congress and the military. One of the primary concerns voiced by Congressional and military members was the perceived negative affect allowing homosexuals to openly serve would have on good order and discipline.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Soft Power Projection
The United States military has been predisposed to fight conventional warfare since the Civil War. Today the United States is confronted with numerous irregular wars characterized by counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction operations. In an attempt to prevent future irregular wars, the United States must adapt its whole of government approach to leveraging 'soft power' to mitigate or prevent future conflicts around the world. To do so, the nation must empower and support the State Department's leadership role in shaping the diplomatic, political, and military global environment. As a supporting capability, the Department of Defense's fleet of strategic airlifters represents a critical mission enabler that can rapidly project interagency shaping operations. By assessing, planning, coordinating, and practicing and executing interagency humanitarian relief efforts, the United States can leverage its national soft power to attract, not coerce, global audiences.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Waters Without Borders
In response to demographic forces, climate change, globalization, shifting societal values and norms, low rates of adoption of technological innovation, inadequate domestic and international laws, and market forces, pressures on water resources have increased to levels unprecedented in human history. Unanswered, the trend will accelerate in the future.Despite earlier perceptions that water scarcity most often leads to conflict, many recent studies conclude that cooperation is actually a more prevalent outcome in situations where two or more countries share water resources. Either way, future trends should not be overly predicated on past outcomes given that the anticipated scale of the impending water crisis exponentially outstrips scarcity conditions experienced to date. This paper explores possible future outcomes of interaction over shared international water resources based on two driving forces: governance and technology. Strengthened national and international governance can overcome geopolitical tendencies that would otherwise discourage cooperation. High levels of technological innovation, transfer, and adoption that increase water-use efficiency or available supply reduce immediate pressures and buy time for enduring cooperative mechanisms for governing shared water resources to develop. While universal cooperation over shared water resources is the obvious ultimate goal, the most immediate concern for the US is to prevent armed conflicts and widespread social upheaval in regions with overlapping US national interests. An understanding of what creates shared water resource "flashpoints" and the conditions that favor conflagration into larger regional conflicts is a valuable policy planning tool.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Command and Control of Airpower
Recent experiences in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have highlighted the need for adaptable and tailorable airpower command and control (C2) systems that can better serve the joint force across the entire range of operations. Though the Air Force has done a good job adapting the existing C2 system to the task, at times using a variety of control frameworks, it has not yet looked at future C2 requirements holistically in order to create a "toolbox of capabilities" that avoids the need for poorly optimized piece-meal or work-around solutions. Simply stated, as battlefield dynamics change and technology moves forward, air employment and its associated C2 systems must also change to remain relevant. The inattention has resulted in obsolete elements of the Theater Air Command System, Air Operations Centers funded at 50 percent (or less), poor command relationships, and an unwieldy C2 structure that is difficult to tailor for today's fight.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Terrorists Across the Table
The purpose of this essay is to consider the viability of the current US strategy to combat terror, the appropriateness of negotiating with absolute and contingent terrorist organizations, and the implications of negotiations in view of US National Security Policy. The 9/11 terrorists attacks prompted US lawmakers to reconsider the efficacy of US National Security Strategy. What ensued was a change in US National Security Strategy doctrine, which among other changes, outlined the United States' policy of not negotiating with terrorists. While current US policy clearly establishes the US's resolve not to have democracy encumbered or its' sovereignty questioned, some stipulate that the fruits of such a policy have yet to be produced. Increasing terrorist activity in Iraq, resurgent terrorist activity in Afghanistan, and Bin Laden's ability to elude capture and direct credible attacks, call into question the effectiveness of the US's stated policy of non-negotiation with terrorists.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Building Partner Capacity With Operationally Responsive Space
Observers of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) will note the recent emergence of the terms "contested domain" or "contested environment" regarding U.S. operations in space. The phrase "space is a contested domain" is almost always used in a context meant to evoke thoughts of adversaries actively struggling for superiority in an environment of military utility. This is natural as the appearance of the language occurred after notable recent hostile actions taken against various space assets, which include Iraq's use of Global Positioning System jammers in 2003; the jamming of satellite communications by Iran and Libya in 2003 and 2005, respectively; and, most dramatically, the Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007. Although it is natural to focus on the militaristic "hard power" aspects of a contested space domain, it is equally important to note the presence of an existing "soft power" contest as well. While the U.S. must certainly address ways to mitigate or defeat threats to its space systems, it must also address its general space competitiveness, to include the cooperation and support it promotes with other nations. "Cooperation and support" actions should include efforts by the United States to use its current position as the world's dominant space actor to influence the entry and growth of partner nations in space. As the DoD's Executive Agent for Space, the Air Force is ideally suited to take a prominent role in such an activity through two existing initiatives -- Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) and the United States Air Force Global Partnership Strategy (USAFGPS). While the vision for ORS and USAFGPS already includes consideration for international partnerships, predominately with existing space-faring allies, this paper will argue that there are additional benefits if the partnership concept is expanded to include growing space capabilities with limited or non space-faring nations.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
A New Vector for Air Force Development of Joint Leaders
This thesis asks the following question: how should the Air Force develop joint leaders? To answer that question, the thesis describes the historical, legal, and policy context of jointness and defines attributes of joint leadership; determines the extent to which the Air Force is represented in leadership positions within the joint community; identifies elements of Air Force policy and culture that enhance or detract from the development of joint officers; proposes solutions to enhance joint officer development for airmen; and assesses the proposed solutions using the criteria of feasibility and effectiveness.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
