Southeast Asia
America's strategy to combat terrorism, resulting from Al-Qaeda's 2001 attacks, falls short of its intent to defeat transnational terrorism. While the tenets of the current counterterrorism strategy were written broadly to enable global employment, this template approach proved ineffective. While focusing its efforts on dismantling terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq, America neglected parts in Southeast Asia that provided sanctuary to Islamic terrorists. Such sanctuaries facilitated the regrouping, recruiting, and training of Al-Qaeda operatives to conduct subsequent attacks against America and its allies throughout the world. The central research question is: What strategy can the US employ to eliminate Al-Qaeda's influence throughout the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines? Recommended strategy changes were generated from applying a three-step analysis approach. First, analyzing the adversary established a foundation from which to develop recommendations to counter Al-Qaedas operations. Second, analyzing three Southeast Asian governments' responses to terrorist threats within their country assisted in the formulation of a counterterror strategy for the region. Finally, the analysis of the current counterterror strategy resulted in recommended adjustments to each of America's instruments of national power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--to facilitate elimination of Al-Qaeda's influence in Southeast Asia. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Harnessing the Military's Voice
Since 9/11 many articles have been written, studies undertaken and recommendations made in an effort to repair America's hemorrhaging public diplomacy (PD) capabilities. However, these efforts, intended to serve as holistic reviews of the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus, fail to adequately address the existing shortcomings within the Department of Defense (DoD) or, more importantly, to truly explore methods to better harness the military's significant potential to enhance the country's public diplomacy capability. Its size, budget and overseas presence make DoD perhaps the most powerful voice for U.S. public diplomacy, which in turn warrant a more detailed and critical review of its role and capabilities. To gain a full understanding of the issues and gather information relevant to making the recommendations included in the report, the authors conducted: " A thorough review of existing public diplomacy studies, draft directives, policy proposals and scholarly writings, with particular focus on those findings and recommendations that addressed the military " A review of existing doctrine and training programs to discern the extent to which they addressed public diplomacy " Interviews with relevant DoD, Department of State (DoS), Defense Science Board (DSB) and other agency officials and public diplomacy experts to gain insights into current efforts and challenges associated with DoD's attempts to define its public diplomacy role " Interviews with selected military leaders to garner insights from their personal experiences during recent deployments The authors then analyzed the available data to determine the key findings suggested by the information and developed a set of specific recommendations matched to each of the findings. This study, while not sufficiently comprehensive to address every aspect of DoD's public diplomacy task, does discern a number of significant issues that, if addressed, would likely improve both the military's ability to win heart minds andThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Militants of the Mangroves
The United States is highly dependent upon Nigeria for oil and natural gas products. Instability in the Niger Delta threatens a significant portion of the world's oil production. Stabilizing the situation in Nigeria is vital to United States national security interests. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is a Nigerian indigenous militant organization that targets oil facilities in an attempt to obtain a greater share of the oil revenue. Primarily comprised of unemployed, disaffected youth from the Ijaw minority ethnic group, MEND single-handedly has been disrupting the world's oil supply. Seen as freedom fighters to the local population and criminals to the government, MEND has given the issue of resource control of the Niger Delta an international stage.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Regenerative Agriculture
Regenerative agriculture offers powerful climate change and ecosystem restoration solutions by rebuilding soil health, increasing biodiversity, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions from food systems. This Global Climate Solutions Insight examines how policy frameworks, financial mechanisms, and technology innovation can mainstream regenerative practices for long-term sustainability and resilience. - Understand how regenerative agriculture contributes to climate change mitigation and ecosystem restoration- Explore the role of soil health in enhancing carbon sequestration and water retention- Learn how integrated land-use policies can support biodiversity and rural development- Gain insight into how financial instruments like green bonds and carbon markets drive adoption- See how climate funds and public-private partnerships scale regenerative agriculture- Familiarize yourself with digital tools and precision agriculture for sustainable farm management- Understand how traceability and blockchain enhance transparency in regenerative value chains- Learn how innovation ecosystems and knowledge-sharing networks foster global regenerative transitions This Insight is essential reading for professionals advancing climate change strategies, circular economy models, and sustainable land use policies. It supports readers in aligning regenerative agriculture with ecosystem restoration and long-term food system resilience.
Winning the Long War
Criticism and condemnation of al-Qaeda that originate from the worldwide Muslim community present the most formidable challenge to its existence and legitimacy as an organization and movement. There is ample literature that questions whether or not there are Muslim challenges to the ideology and harmful acts of violent extremists such as al-Qaeda. However there is a growing body of literature from the worldwide Muslim community that challenges al-Qaeda. Consequently, challenges to al-Qaeda that originate from the worldwide Muslim community are critical because they are a component in any strategy to defeat al-Qaeda. The identification, amplification, and exploitation of these Muslim challenges will serve to defeat al-Qaeda. The purpose of this monograph is to determine the nature of this Muslim challenge to al-Qaeda. This is accomplished by analyzing the recent revisions of the former mujahid that helped create al-Qaeda and developed its jihadi ideology, Sayyid Imam. In these revisions entitled Rationalizing Jihad, Sayyid Imam criticizes and condemns al-Qaeda and other violent extremists. To determine the legitimacy of his revisions, the major themes of Rationalizing Jihad are compared to the prescriptions in classical Islamic jurisprudence. Sayyid Imam's stature and influence within the mujahidin community is so great it prompted an immediate response from al-Qaeda's intellectual leader and second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. His response and that of nine other former and current mujahidin are analyzed in order to examine the rift in al-Qaeda's jihadi ideology and challenges to its tactics, strategy, and ideology. Finally, five recent initiatives by respected and prominent members of the worldwide Muslim community are analyzed to demonstrate the Muslim challenge to al-Qaeda. These challenges from Sayyid Imam, the ideological rift among mujahidin such as al-Zawahiri, initiatives from the worldwide Muslim community, and the identification, amplification, and exploThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Suicide Bombers in CONUS
This monograph analyzes recent (post-1980) suicide bombings and determines the probability of the same in the Continental United States (CONUS). Analysis includes a brief history of modern suicide bombing and an examination of the strategic, tactical, social and individual logic of suicide bombing. It addresses the probable characteristics of suicide bombings against the U.S., both within CONUS and abroad. The monograph also makes recommendations about what can be done to mitigate future bombings. Finally, Appendix A lists 2,202 suicide bombings since 1980, and as of early 2007 is the best available open source suicide bombing database in the world. Suicide attackers have been a part of warfare for over two millennia, but the coupling of suicide attackers and explosives greatly increased the importance and effectiveness of this tactic in the 20th century. The modern phenomenon of suicide bombing had its genesis in the Iran-Iraq War from 1980-88. Ayatollah Khomeini used his influence to motivate young Iranians to commit suicide attacks, but he was successful in framing such attacks as martyrdom operations. Concurrent with the Iran-Iraq War, Iran influenced the development of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah tried suicide bombing on somewhat of a trial basis against the U.S. and France, and then later against Israel. Unfortunately, Hezbollah achieved both strategic and tactical success and proved the efficacy of suicide bombing. Not surprisingly, other groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Palestinians and the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (PKK) started employing suicide bombers in the 1980s and 1990s. As suicide bombing spread geographically and ideologically, it also increased in sophistication. It advanced from being a simple bomb delivered by truck, to include suicide vests, boat bombs, and eventually airplanes. Target sets similarly expanded. Once the taboo against suicide was overcome, previous distinctions among civilian non-coThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
International Armament Cooperative Programs
The Joint Strike Fighter international program is unique; indeed there is no other example of a U.S. major prime contractor co-developing and co-producing a U.S. combat aircraft with other foreign entities. Consequently, the program provides an excellent model to evaluate in view of the new Department of Defense international acquisition strategy requirements. This paper is a preliminary analysis that seeks to answer the questions: what are the benefits and liabilities of the JSF international acquisition approach thus far, and what are the necessary precursors or conditions that should exist for future international cooperative programs to have the best chance of success? Such answers are relevant given that DoD now looks to international armament cooperative programs as the first option for future weapon systems acquisition strategies. Finally, the paper will identify barriers that are 'hard-wired' into our acquisition regulations, policies and statues that restrict cooperation, fail to take advantage of the global defense industrial market, and are antithetical to our National Security Strategy coalition goals. The paper concludes with recommendations intended to improve the success for future international cooperative initiativesThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Planning for Psychological Operations
It is incumbent upon the state to gain support for national objectives. Employment of instruments of power is designed to influence other nations and organizations to respond favorably. Therefore, impacting the decision making process is the underlying principle for IOP power projection and highlights the psychological element. During a period of declining resources and increased world competition, the United States must find new ways to reach out and promote American interests. In order to maximize the impact and exploit the influence events create, joint planning and interagency coordination of psychological operations are critical. The current ad hoc interagency coordination and joint planning process do not maximize the psychological factors' impact and fully exploit its asymmetrical influence on a target audience's decision making process. Traditional views towards concepts, particularly military PSYOP, do not lead to the innovative solutions demanded by an environment of declining funds and resources. This study recognizes the multidimensional aspect of military PSYOP and calls for redefining an area of operations that has changed little over the years. Additionally, the establishment of an organization responsible for the development of a national marketing strategy integrating all IOPs to achieve objectives beyond the tactical level is advocated. Reviewing subject matter literature from the last forty years provided the project's basis for concepts relating to PSYOP and the Soviet missile gap deception case study. Internet searches, interviews, and recent literature brought current issues to light and developed a picture of U.S. organizations involved in influencing target audiences.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Christian Extremism as a Domestic Terror Threat
Americans readily identify Muslim extremism as a viable threat to America. However, they ignore or remain unaware of Christian extremism in the same context, despite the similarities in ideology that advocate violence against Americans. For example, the motivation behind Eric Rudolph's bombing of the Olympics in Atlanta in 1996 was to "embarrass and punish the U.S. government" for its pro-abortion stance. This monograph explores what, if any, domestic terror threat Christian extremism poses and follows the Constructivist approach: how ideas define structure, how this structure defines interests, and how actors take action as a result. Initially focusing on the history and core beliefs of the Christian Identity movement and radical fringes of Dominion and Reconstruction theology, this monograph identifies two major underlying themes in Christian extremism. The first is racism through the use of religion as an accelerant to promote violence. The second is religiously motivated terrorism to support what is perceived as God's will and law. In addition, this monograph analyzes federal law enforcement action against Christian extremism through a series of case studies that took place in Mountainhome, Arkansas, Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas. The analysis of the catastrophic consequences from Ruby Ridge and Waco with the Oklahoma City bombing follows. Concluding this monograph are the lessons learned, comparison of federal law enforcement's action in each case study, and analyzing the tactics and leadership involved. Whereas the FBI's tactics and leadership exercised proved highly successful in Arkansas, they were disastrous in Idaho and Texas. Finally, this monograph provides a domestic terror threat assessment with recommended actions in what is not only a law enforcement issue, but a war of ideology between tolerance and understanding versus hate and bigotry. While difficult to implement, the recommended actions contribute to the understanding of Christian extremisThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
The Army National Gaurd and the Department of Homeland Security
This AY-10 USAWC resident student paper argues that the citizen-soldiers of the Army National Guard have lost their focus and original purpose as a State Militia available for disaster recovery operations, assisting law enforcement, and defending the homeland. The author believes that the pressure felt by the current operations tempo to use the Army National Guard as an operational reserve can only be alleviated by moving the Army National Guard from the Department of Defense to the Department of Homeland Security. He asserts that such a move will not cut off relationships developed between the Army and the National Guard, two organizations with a common history, but recognizes that the two organizations should have different primary missions of homeland security (National Guard) and national defense (U.S. Army). He bases his argument in part upon the fact that this realization of similar capabilities but different missions is already working between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Navy.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
The Acme of Skill
Non-kinetic warfare, or conflict without the use of force for the purpose of inflicting physical damage, is rapidly gaining in importance. Scholars of war even from the time of Sun Zi have articulated that the enemy's destruction is neither essential nor necessarily the best route to ultimate victory. The insurgency attributes that have characterized many wars since World War II suggest that the objective of warfare has shifted from the kinetic destruction of military forces to the non-kinetic impairment of the enemy's will to fight. The four global trends identified here, economic prosperity, freedom of information, the rise of nationalism and globalization and interdependence, are possible causes for this shift, but, more importantly, they are factors that make war a less attractive option than ever. The last major conflict between major powers was won with barely a single kinetic conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union-an excellent model of non-kinetic conflict and perhaps a sign of things to come. In the Cold War, the military largely played a supporting role. In an age characterized by the information revolution and globalization, the Information and Diplomatic instruments of power will rise in importance. Even in a supporting role, the Military instrument nonetheless remains relevant, not least because kinetic conflict can never be ruled out. However its non-kinetic potential needs to be developed in order for it to be more effective in today's world. Three ways to achieving this end are: developing an interagency approach to the military; imbuing a supporting diplomatic role for the military; and a comprehensive and coherent information strategy not only for the military, but at all levels of government.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Eating Soup With a Spoon
There is little executable counterinsurgency doctrine existing in joint publications. What little exists is too vague to establish a foundation for the development of tactical level doctrine because there is no operational authoritative guidance for long-duration counterinsurgency operations. The purpose of this paper is to begin to examine this issue. Tracing the linkages and analyzing existing counterinsurgency doctrine from the strategic to the tactical level will determine what, if anything exists. The observations garnered from that analysis will suggest fundamental changes. Finally, these doctrinal recommendations will suggest methods for organizing, training, and equipping the future force to execute that doctrine.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Sharpening The Needle
In order to prepare for future urban operations, the USAF must place Non-Lethal Weapon (NLW) development in the forefront of its research programs and match them to Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The world population continues to grow and an ever-increasing percentage is moving to the cities to find sustenance and employment. America's enemies have discovered how to anchor an otherwise superior force in the urban quagmire, where a single instance of Collateral Damage (CD) can have strategic effects. These two factors will converge in the future and place the US at a significant disadvantage unless the USAF prepares now. Non-lethal technology can avoid massive structural damage and civilian deaths during urban combat by giving commanders options in situations where employing lethal technology would be inappropriate. The Active Denial System (ADS), Infrasound generator, and High-Power Microwave (HPM) are different types of electro-magnetic NLW that can easily be matched to UAS. The UAS has the unique advantages of persistence, expendability, and low cost compared to manned aircraft. Future adversaries will no doubt continue to recognize the asymmetric advantage of urban combat when facing the US. NLW-equipped air power can provide crucial support to joint forces across the entire spectrum of urban warfare, from peacekeeping to major combat operations. NLW-equipped aircraft could mean the difference between success and failure for the US in future joint urban operations.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Influence Operations
The first part of the paper helps detail the argument for "why" an effective influence organization is required. The second part of the paper examines successes and failures of the US information influence, and propaganda machine in previous conflicts and possible lessons learned. The third part of the paper outlines a recommended organization to meet the requirement detailed in part one. The research method used for this paper is the problem/solution method. The paper examines the problem of the United States Government's lack of an effective organization to enable unity of effort in countering propaganda by VEOs. This paper explores a solution to maximize efficiency and improve the United States Government's ability to counter VEO influence. The United States Government needs to create an organization dedicated to influence operations with the necessary authorities, manpower, and budget to perform operations at the appropriate attribution levels to effectively win the information component of the Global War on Terror. Significant unclassified documentation exists regarding the execution of information operations in both current and past operations. Primary sources for this paper included Air University Library textbooks and magazines, as well as material from online resources such as EBSCOhost, ProQuest, and LexisNexis. References included PME based research papers, professional journals, and various geopolitical websites. Additionally, the author conducted interviews with information operations experts via phone and email.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
The New Cold War
The thesis of this paper is that terrorist groups like al-Qaida and its allies are instruments of a radical Islamic fundamentalist movement that is waging a New Cold War against the US and fellow democracies. The explication of this thesis involves exploring the underlying factors the radical Islamic fundamentalist effort in the New Cold War. It begins by describing the movement in terms of three characteristics: ideology, leadership and enabling environment. The discussion also highlights similarities between the current foe and the one the US faced in the first Cold War and incorporates examples of how radical Islamic fundamentalism conducts battle by proxy with democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia. This paper concludes with recommendations on how the lessons from US history, the current successes in the Indo-Malay response to terrorism, and DIME initiatives can help the democracies win the New Cold war.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Why the Air Force Can't Do Influence Operations
The Air Force has articulated a robust mission set for Information Operations to include the subset operations designated as Influence Operations (IO). However, unlike the more developed elements of the IO triad - electronic Warfare Operations and Network Warfare Operations - it violates many cultural assumptions of the Air Force; thereby making its development as a functional operational area unlikely. This paper compares Air Force and IO cultural assumptions to assess threats to and opportunities for change and then makes recommendations on how best to make IFO a functional component of the Air Force arsenal. The recommendations include initiatives to promote harmonization of Air Force and IFO culture that include developing a common language, developing IFO pioneers that will speak Air Force while developing IFO consciousness within the service at large. This process will also create improved education, targeting, and procedures, as well as a linking up with other practitioners.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Reducing AWACS Perstempo
The study seeks to gain a Combat Air Force (CAF) wide solution to reduce AWACS PERSTEMPO to a level commensurate with the AEF construct. The literature review will focus on the Air Expeditionary Force concept. Initially, we will explore the AEF Program Action Directive (PAD) to discern Low Density/High Demand capabilities as forwarded by the service. We will then investigate the Joint tasking process and seek a congruent tasking level between the service AEF goal of 90 days in 15 months and the Blackhawk shoot down mandate of 120 days. We will then take a historic view of E-3 PERSTEMPO rates in the 1990s and the success or failure of the joint tasking process to meet the 120 day goal.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Air Power in MOOTW
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the effectiveness of no-fly zones and to assess the contextual factors that influence success. The measures of success for the no-fly zones are: a) achievement of air objectives b) congruency between air objectives and higher level objectives, and c) actual effects of each no-fly zone on higher level objectives and a desired end state. The air objectives of each no-fly zone has been to prevent flights of all aircraft not in support of the allied forces, to protect civilians from aerial bombardment, and to provide air supremacy for other missions. The no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina achieved limited success in achieving air objectives, while the two no-fly zones over Iraq have been very successful. The air objectives of each no-fly zone have been congruent with national objectives. The success of the November 1995 negotiations in Dayton, Ohio is testament to the positive progress toward all of the long term objectives for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The long term effects of operations in Iraq are unclear. To overcome limitations imposed by the physical environment, proper synchronization between all forces will be essential. Rules of engagement for military operations should simplify coordination, integration, and identification among forces so that execution can be decentralized. The long term impact of U.S. military presence in the Gulf should be studied further. If ending the oppression of the Shiites in southern Iraq is a U.S. objective, then a reevaluation of the forces in theater is necessary. This study supports the hypothesis that no-fly zones are an effective strategy for U.S. forces.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Rebalancing the Nuclear Weapons Triad
Since 1960, the United States has maintained a nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear capable strategic bombers and submarine launched ballistic missiles. As technology advanced and new capabilities were developed, the nuclear arsenal quickly expanded. The number of strategic nuclear weapons in the United States peaked during the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and then significantly declined as the two countries agreed to lower numbers through a series of treaties. This paper examines the history of the US nuclear weapons triad and how the strategic nuclear force structure might look in 2025 given the recent release of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The global security outlook is also briefly discussed. Research was conducted through review of government documents, publications from national organizations, and articles written by experts in the field. With the smaller nuclear stockpile the necessity of maintaining all three legs of the triad has been questioned in several publications. For example, a 2009 paper sponsored by the Air Force Association, Triad, Dyad or Monad? Shaping the US Nuclear Force for the Future, recommended the US move to a nuclear dyad by removing the nuclear role of B-52s and B-2s. However, even though the New START ratified in 2010 further reduces the number of nuclear weapons in the stockpile, it maintains the nuclear triad structure for at least the next 10 years. The research concludes that the US nuclear triad should be maintained for at least the next two decades with a 15 to 20 percent further reduction in the nuclear strategic stockpile beyond the New START limits.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
From Mission Creep to Smart Power
The size of the Defense Department both in terms of financial resources and personnel resources dwarfs the State Department. This unevenness has caused the Defense Department to pick up new missions that traditionally belong to the State Department. The negative consequences go beyond simply high operational tempo. There are also the international perceptions of U.S. military in uniform performing diplomatic functions.American servicemen and women can be trained to accomplish any task, but they will never take off their uniform. The camouflage on the uniform will always evoke sentiments of defense, security and force when needed. When security is assured and the mission shifts to development, training and diplomacy, the U.S. urgently needs a robust State Department fully able to seamlessly step in where the military left off. Currently, this capability does not fully exist. This paper examines where resources and missions can be shifted. Where changes make sense one next has to look at the likelihood that proposals will be politically, practically and economically viable. The second half of the paper examines both the inside and outside players that have influence impacting these proposals and departments. This paper used all available resources that were available as of December 2010.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Catastrophic Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorist Attack on U.S. Homeland
The basic investigation of this paper is the dilemma of balancing military effectiveness versus moral righteousness. There are times when our military is called upon to perform tasks that when executed may violate our personal morals, customary law or even international law. This balance is particularly difficult in times of extreme crises where national decisions are clouded with more emotion than reason. Just war theory is a well traditioned doctrine used to guide moral reasoning in deciding to conduct war and in the actual conduct of war. There are times, however, where just war theory is overridden or even ignored in the name of perceived greater justice. One such doctrine that allows for an exception to just war theory and its restraints on war is the supreme emergency doctrine proposed by prominent moral theorist Michael Walzer. A clear and present danger to the U.S. today is the threat of a catastrophic terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This type of threat may qualify as a supreme emergency, even more so immediately after a successful terrorist attack occurs. This "worst case" scenario poses the basic question: What are legitimate U.S. responses to this action? The historical example of the supreme emergency exemption seems to suggest that very few restraints of war cannot be overridden, therefore leaving every option still on the table to national leadership and military planners. This is not the case in today's environment as the just war theory principles of discrimination and proportionality should not be violated regardless of the atrocities committed against the U.S. To violate sacred just war theory principles such as noncombatant immunity would be to forfeit the very American ideals and rights that a campaign of terrorism response would aim to protect. This paper will research the supreme emergency exemption from just war theory as it applies to a terrorist WMD attack on the U.S. scenario. It will first review the strateg contThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Deficit Delusion
There's a growing consensus about the causes of budget deficits and the national debt. And that's the problem. At present, members of the Left claim that higher rates of taxation levied on the rich are the fix, members of the Right call for a combination of spending cuts, tax increases and entitlement reform, while supply siders confidently assert that the path out of debt is tax cuts that will shower the Treasury with higher tax revenues borne of soaring economic growth. The solutions flamboyantly mistake the problem. In his latest and arguably most pathbreaking book, Parkview Institute president John Tamny asks readers to contemplate government debt in an all-new way, and in doing so makes a powerful case that deficits and the national debt will continue to grow precisely because left, right and supply side profoundly misunderstand why there's debt in the first place. While the warring ideologies promote what they imagine are different solutions to the perceived debt problem, it's lost on them that they're basically saying the same thing: an insufficiency of federal tax revenue has resulted in deficits and debt that seemingly soar without endpoint. Tamny makes a case that the arguments fail repeatedly precisely because they're backwards. Drawing on examples from private individuals and businesses, Tamny turns the debt discussion on its head. Far from a signal of insufficient revenue, Tamny shows that government debt is a logical and perilous effect of market optimism about rising tax revenues now, and much more dangerous, the expectation of exponentially more tax revenue in the future. Readers of The Deficit Delusion will gradually see the folly of a deficit and debt discussion that has grown stale and terribly confused, all the while looking at the Reagan tax cuts, skyrocketing government debt in California, entitlement reform, and the soaring national debt through an entirely different lens. Far from an apology for all the government debt, Tamny makes a passionate case that the debt crisis is not what the alarmists of the competing ideologies imagine it to be, but is instead one of soaring tax revenue itself that, if unchecked, will render the national debt of the moment rather pedestrian in comparison to what's ahead. For far too long readers have been inundated with the same arguments and same solutions dressed up differently to feed the differing views of the competing ideologies. With The Deficit Delusion, readers finally have a book that will prove the mask-off moment for left, right and supply side.
Time is Trauma
Time is Trauma: Improving U.S. Planned Response to a WMD This paper will address our nation's federal response to a WMD based on previous performance during Type I disasters. It will take into account critical agencies and what areas can be improved upon to be ready when a WMD has been exposed. The improvements discussed will be in concert with our federalist form of government.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Assessing Proposals for Interagency Reorganization
US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the U.S. Government to reassess its interagency capabilities. In the wake of these conflicts, Congress held hearings in order to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the interagency process and evaluate different remedies. Numerous organizations and national security experts testified and presented their studies analyzing the interagency process and its shortcomings. Using the body of evidence presented to them, Senators Lugar and Biden made recommendations for revamping the interagency process. These studies presented compelling cases for change however, their recommendations failed to consider some significant factors. Much of the research focused on developing a new organizational structure without fully understanding the environment in which these organizations operate. Additionally, the studies failed to consider organizational theory and its application to the interagency process. Instead, the recommendations focused on accountability and efficiency but failed to consider information management and coordination among and between agencies. In order to account for the numerous factors impacting interagency coordination a detailed examination of the congressional requirements, "think tank" recommendations, the environment, and organizational theory were required. Two studies provide different approaches to organizational design. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols by the Center for Strategic and International Studies approached interagency reorganization using a traditional 20th century organizational design.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Sustaining the Air Commons
This chapter will discuss the nature of the air commons and how it is governed and defended. It will then explore developments that may challenge the sustained openness and stability of the air commons in peacetime and emerging challenges to America's ability to control the air during wartime. In conclusion, it will recommend steps to modernize and expand access to the air commons, strengthen the international architecture that governs it, and reinforce the United States' command of the air commons.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Unfocused Energy
Over the past decade, the U.S. government struggled consistently to establish a solid foothold in the global marketplace of ideas. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and through two persistent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. expends significant national resource toward promoting, explaining, and defending its actions to audiences of particular strategic importance to U.S. national security like the Afghan people. The Obama administration made a redoubled commitment in late 2009 to successfully conclude the war in Afghanistan. With Afghanistan as a focus of the new administration's foreign policy, it also becomes a key front line for U.S. strategic communications efforts. The author focuses on strategic communications in Afghanistan with an eye toward understanding and improvement. Once an understanding of the U.S. strategic communications system is established, an analysis of the unique STRATCOM challenges in Afghanistan will be presented. Finally, once the two strategic communication environments are established, an analysis of current STRATCOM operations will be presented along with recommendations for improvement.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Assessing Chinese Intentions for the Military Use of the Space Domain
The continuing rise of Chinese political and military power has made Americans suspicious of China's intentions in the space domain. For many in the American defense community, the 2007 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test was the smoking gun that proved China's ultimate desire to challenge American space dominance. Other experts, however, have proposed a more benign intent behind such actions, leading to vigorous debates over Chinese motives and the appropriate American responses. How can American policymakers decipher Chinese intentions for space to craft sound defense policy? This monograph proposes that to understand Chinese intentions, it is necessary to examine the current schools of military thought vying for influence within China's policymaking apparatus.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
A Shared Common Operational Picture in the Fight Against Terror and Organized Crime
Transnational terrorist organizations and organized crime groups are both considered national security threats to the United States. While the fight against organized crime has been underway for over a hundred years, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is relatively new, emerging just over five years ago. Both fights, however, are against thinking enemies who continuously adapt and evolve their tactics, techniques, and procedures.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
How the Current View of the Air and Space Environment Influences Development of Military Space Forces
Perceptions determine actions. The military's perception of the air and space environment influences the type of space forces it will develop in the future. This paper addresses this perception by answering the following question: How does the current view of the air and space environment influence the development of military space forces? The research method centered on surveying literature and interviewing DOD policy makers to develop the idea that the military's current organizational paradigm is a paradox that sees space as a medium, separate from air, while at the same time, bound to it physically, theoretically, and historically. This paradox creates a dilemma that influences the military's ability to advocate and justify requirements, and ultimately garner resources to develop a viable space force. The paper develops measures of merit to show organizational evidence of how these linking and separating positions of the paradigm express themselves within the military. This has both positive and negative aspects for space force development. It promotes a healthy climate for debate, but at the same time, frustrates DOD's ability to generate a healthy concept-pull environment. The paper concludes by opening the door to ideas for resolving the dilemma the current paradigm presents.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
A Knowledge Matrix Modeling of the Intelligence Cycle
This effort models information flow through the United States Intelligence Community's Intelligence Cycle using a knowledge matrix methodology. The knowledge matrix methodology takes explicit data from multiple sources and fuses that data to measure a current level of knowledge about a target, or situation. Knowledge matrices are used to develop a measure of user-needs satisfaction. User-needs satisfaction compares requested levels of knowledge to a probability of collecting that knowledge within a designated timeframe. This effort expands the work done by Captain Carl Pawling in his March 2004 thesis, Modeling and Simulation of the Military Intelligence Process, by modeling intelligence as an opportunistic, multi-source, multi-entity system of systems. The value of intelligence fusion is compared, and analyzed between three different algorithms; no fusion, a mixed forward and fuse strategy, and strict fusion strategy. These fusion algorithms are then applied to competing intelligence collection architectures in varying intelligence activity scenarios to determine which architectures will most improve the probability of satisfactory collection. Satisfactory collection is measured in terms of quantity, timeliness, and user-need satisfaction of completed intelligence reports.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Information Warfare
This paper shows how the conduct of military operations in the Information Age demands new strategies, new tactics, and new ways of thinking. It raises moral and ethical issues regarding the relationship between the military, the media, and the American public; and it explores the relationship between Information warfare (IW) and Public Affairs (PA). Three possible options emerge regarding the IW roles PA might adopt. Option One-a "Hands Off policy"-seeks to avoid any association with IW and represents the current PA approach. Option Two upholds the primacy of truth and acknowledges the active role PA must take in IW. Option Three suggests PA abandon its policy to tell the truth and actively engage in all IW activities.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Military Role in Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction threatens Americans and our armed forces every day. To many nations and groups, their only means to counter the United States is with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction is no longer a question of "if" they will be used, but a question of "when" they will be used. This paper looks at the US military capability to counter terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. It describes the terrorist threat to US forces and motives and reasons terrorists would use these types of weapons. Our current national policy, strategy and doctrine highlight the problem, but show a need to improve interagency coordination and cooperation. On the military level, combating the threat is an integral part of our strategy but needs increased emphasis at the planning level. Capabilities exist to deter or counter the threat; protect our forces; and sustain and operate after an NBC attack. But countering a terrorist threat presents unique challenges to future leaders and requires improvements in intelligence, equipment, training and education. The key to defeating the terrorist threat is timely and accurate intelligence for detection, characterization, and countering the threat. Improvements in individual and collective protection are necessary to sustain operations. As important, the military needs to emphasize realistic joint and combined training and needs to add chemical and biological scenarios to future war games. Finally, the US must be prepared to destroy terrorist weapons prior to them being used against us.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
How Does the Political Nature of the Defense Acquisition Process Affect Cost Growth
Many of the major procurement activities and programs of the Department of Defense (DoD) are experiencing cost growth costing the United States (U.S) government money. The purpose of this research was to develop an empirical model in order to explain cost overruns in the DoD major procurement activities and programs.Specifically, this thesis sought to discover relationships between cost overruns inweapon systems programs and factors that the DoD cannot control, factors that originatefrom the political nature of the defense acquisition process. The model describes how thepolitical and legislative balances of power between the parties of the Congress, thechange of the purchase habits of the DoD from production contracts to service contracts, and the spreading of defense manufacturing capacity across the states of the U.S arerelated to cost overruns in defense programs.This research effort studied 193 major weapon system programs from 1970 to2002 using Ordinary Least Square regression techniques. Results show that a DemocraticPresident leads to a reduction in cost growth, while control of both houses of Congress byone party, or control of the Senate and the office of the President by one party causes costincreases.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Strategies for Preparing United States Army Combat Organizations for the Inevitability of Casualties
In this author's opinion, the United States Army is not doing enough to prepare combat organizations for the inevitability of casualties. This thesis proposes the following primary research question: How can United States Army combat organizations better prepare for the inevitability of casualties? The United States of America has been in a state of war for over 11 years. Every passing day our nation's most precious commodity, our soldiers, are being killed or wounded in action on the battlefield. Yet, every day organizations across the Army are either preparing for war or are actively engaged in conflict without being properly prepared to face the grim reality that they will most likely lose someone within their ranks. This qualitative research effort seeks to identify effective strategies and techniques to assist United States Army combat organizations to prepare for the inevitability of casualties. The secondary research questions are: (1) What can be done to better prepare United States Army combat organizations prior to the occurrence of casualties; (2) What can be done to assist United States Army combat organizations to execute their duties once there has been a casualty? This thesis will enable organizational leaders to understand and incorporate strategies and techniques that will assist them in preparing their units for the realities of combat.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Creating a New Reality
Deception as a means to achieve surprise is a recurring theme in the history of warfare. Successful deception uses information to manipulate and shape an adversary's perception of the world to a viewpoint that creates an atmosphere in which the adversary acts in accordance to the deceiver's will. Deception is a complex problem that crosses the boundaries of several disciplines including sociology, psychology, and political studies. Today's information environment, however, demands a further examination of deception's relevance in the modern world. Given the technological explosion over the past two decades with respect to information flow and availability, certain questions arise. How do Information Age changes affect deception operations? Do they relegate deception to old world lore or does the increased access to knowledge and information increase deception opportunities and its effectiveness? In short, what effect does the Information Age have on the overall deception process and what are the ramifications for today's political and military strategists? In answering these questions, the deception process is simplified in a process model that encapsulates the core components of the information exchange and the interaction between deceiver and the target of the deception.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Rethinking Insurgency
The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War when other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more pressing. With the onset of the Global War on Terror in 2001 and the ensuing involvement of the U.S. military in counterinsurgency support in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency experienced renewed concern in both the defense and intelligence communities. The author argues that while exceptionally important, this relearning process focused on Cold War era nationalistic insurgencies rather than the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War security environment. To be successful at counterinsurgency, he contends, the U.S. military and defense community must rethink insurgency, which has profound implications for American strategy and military doctrine.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
The Sharpest Sword
Compellence, Clausewitz, and Counterinsurgency -- a seemingly strange trinity -- in actuality, they are closely related subjects with particular relevance in today's world. The United States has engaged in numerous compellent military actions during the decade of the 1990s; the first five years of the new millennium have seen this trend continue. Despite the country's obvious affinity for this form of warfare, there is little written about it in U.S. military doctrine or strategy documents. Similarly, while a clear compellence construct exists within Carl von Clausewitz's seminal book, On War -- which is studied extensively in military academies and war colleges -- the compellence aspects of Clausewitz's work have not been identified as such previously, and consequently are not emphasized or taught to military officers and strategists. This paper corrects that shortfall and presents Clausewitz's concept of compellence as a coherent framework. Furthermore, with an on-going counterinsurgency effort in Iraq, it is useful to examine the subject of insurgency and counterinsurgency from the standpoint of compellence.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Alternate Futures for 2025
This paper serves as a transition piece between the Air Force 2025 and Blue Horizons futures studies, particularly in the area of study methodology. It reviews forecasting theory and methods to give the reader a general understanding of available long-term planning techniques. It analyzes the methodology used in Air Force 2025 and recommends changes for the follow-on study, Blue Horizons. With the retrospective advantage of a decade of past history, it evaluates Air Force 2025's alternate futures in terms of narrative, wildcards, and signposts. Finally, it assesses where the world of 2006 sits within the strategic planning space and where the world is trending. The paper concludes with five recommendations for Blue Horizons: 1) Institutionalize the futures process into Air Force long-range planning, complete with periodic reevaluations, 2) Use Air Force 2025 methodologies, with minor corrections, for Blue Horizons, 3) Reassess and update the key scenario drivers, 4) Use a Red Team to determine signposts for each of the worlds and use these markers for periodic reevaluation, and 5) Avoid including interim worlds in the study.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Heads, Not Tails
Defending against theater and intercontinental ballistic missiles, potentially carrying nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, requires 100% effectiveness--anything less continues to afford our enemies weapons of mass effect. If the U.S. is to be successful in answering this threat, a re-evaluation of boost phase intercept (BPI) options is in order. This paper highlights the ballistic missile threat and joint defense systems; provides an assessment of those systems; re-evaluates BPI merits; and proposes a kinetic boost phase solution (with concept of operations) to bridge the potential fielding of space-base weapons. Early engagement provides better, faster, cheaper and less destabilizing missile defense capability. "Heads, not tails" sounds a call to the Missile Defense Agency, Strategic Command and all Services to commit to producing BPI capability (first kinetic, then directed energy), ahead of other systems and upgrades.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Alternate Futures for 2025
The importance of long-range planning has never been greater due to thedwindling resources dedicated to defense, debates over roles and missions, and the changing security environment. In response to this need, the Air Force embarked on a wide-ranging effort to improve long-range planning. The Air University-hosted project, Air Force 2025 (or simply 2025 to capture the joint nature of air and space power), looks 30 years into the future and identifies the systems, concepts of operation, and technologies required to ensure the US possesses the dominant air and space forces in the future.In order to envision the world of 2025, the study had to make predictions. Futurists use several methods to "forecast" the future. The approach used for the 2025 study creates alternate futures by examining trends, studying the work of respected futurists, considering surprises and "wild cards," and conducting analyses to identify the factors, or "drivers," that will be major contributors to change.To be effective for planning, these drivers must encapsulate the majorforces likely to shape the world of 2025 and be relevant to theorganization. After extensive analysis, the Alternate Futures' teamidentified American World View, Delta TeK, and World Power Grid as the most important drivers affecting the future and relevant to air and space power. American World View is the US perspective of the world and describes American willingness and capability to interact with the rest of the world. Delta TeK is the differential in the rate of growth and proliferation of technology. World Power Grid describes the generation, transmission, distribution, and control of economic, political, and military power throughout the world.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Changing Empires
The civil-military balances in Turkey and Iran are undergoing fundamental shifts. In Western democracies, civil-military relations are based on an ideal that the military should be subordinate to civilian authorities. While this may be the "norm" in the West, this is not so in Turkey and Iran. Given their directive to support and defend the ideals of their nation's founding leaders (Ataturk in the former case, Khomeini in the latter), the armed forces have sometimes acted independently of their civilian authorities. On occasion, this has led to direct conflict between the civilian and military leadership. In the past few years, however, Turkey's secular military has lost influence to the country's Islamist civilian leadership, while Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has gained against a civilian leadership that it believed was insufficiently committed to the values of the 1979 Islamic revolution. In recent months, this rebalancing of civil-military relations has altered the dynamics in a range of Middle Eastern countries. Under an Islamist government, Turkey has arguably moved away from Israel and towards Iran and Syria. In Iran, the IRGC's heavy hand in rigging the June 12, 2009 election resulted in massive popular protests against the government that continue despite the military's threats. As the two largest regional powers in the Middle East, these changes could have dramatic consequences for regional stability. In February 2010, the arrests of Turkish military officers and the IRGC's crackdown on protestors on the anniversary Iran's revolution provide additional anecdotal evidence that the civil-military balance in both countries is changing. What is needed is a concerted effort to look at the anecdotal evidence using civil-military relations models.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Force Protection
Force protection in the Air Force has taken on greater significance in the new, but well overdue, recognition of its contribution to air and space power. It now has higher priority than ever with senior leadership, extensive research and development efforts are ongoing, and a Force Protection Battlelab has been established--all focused on this one complex mission. Herculean efforts by the entire DoD, particularly since the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers, have resulted in the publishing of literally thousands of pages on program guidance at all DoD levels. Unfortunately, the terms Force Protection and Antiterrorism are now nearly synonymous. This limited program focus does not facilitate a structure designed to ensure a true force protection effort, especially considering the challenges faced by today's Expeditionary Aerospace Force. The purpose of this study is to review existing force protection programs and ongoing initiatives, and then attempt to contribute to further program development from a "bottoms up" perspective. The "bottom" in this case is the base level support group commander. The challenges facing support group commanders in today's Air Force are great, perhaps too great. Managing support operations at permanent main operating bases with all its built-in support structure is one thing. Leading deployed support operations, of which force protection is just one aspect, is another. Simply stated, current expectations of the support group commander are unrealistic and doomed to failure. This study reviews current USAF force protection documentation through a literature review and then proposes a systematic approach to program development designed to enhance synergy in force protection operations. It maintains throughout that the key to effective force protection operations is the role played by the combat support commander.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
CCIR for Complex and Uncertain Environments
The purpose of this monograph is to examine the concept of Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and determine if the doctrine is suitable for particularly complex operations like counter-insurgency operations (COIN). Commanders involved in COIN have developed new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for creating and using CCIR. These TTPs often directly contradict existing doctrine and result in information requirements which fail to meet the criteria established for conventional warfare. These TTPs result from a doctrine that is ambiguous, confusing, and overly complex. CCIR developed in doctrine to accomplish three distinct purposes - to maintain situational understanding, to support decision points, and to manage information. A fourth purpose - to support assessment - is a relatively new addition. These purposes were all developed with conventional warfare in mind. In fact, lessons learned from unconventional wars against insurgents or guerrillas were rarely applied to the concept of CCIR, and were systematically removed from doctrine when they did appear. Army doctrine distinguishes problems by the level of complexity inherent in the situation. COIN represents an ill-structured, or complex, problem. C2 in complex environments must stress flexibility and adaptability, and will result in more adjustment decisions than execution decisions. Successful decisionmaking in complex environments relies not only on a foundation of experience, but also on certain useful characteristics or habits. There are a number of practices common to expert decisionmakers: experts have a knack for setting and defining goals; experts anticipate that they will have to adapt their plans; experts tend to have a higher tolerance for uncertainty, and they have developed several specific tactics for dealing with it. Three of the four purposes of CCIR - maintain situational understanding, support decision points, and support assessment - are related to tactics employed byThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Vulnerability in the Nation璽€(TM)s Homeland Security
The operational tempo of the Army has increased over 300 percent since the Gulf War, yet the size of the Army has decreased by one-third. Many of the capabilities of the active Army have been shifted to the reserve components. This has led to an increased utilization of the Army's reserve components in order to meet the needs of the Army. Today, soldiers from the active Army, the US Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard have been fully integrated into a full spectrum of operations to accomplish the Army's missions. However, this increase in workload for a part-time force structure comes at a cost. This thesis attempts to define the impact of the increased utilization of the reserves on local police department because many reservists are also police officers in their civilian careers. Has their recent, lengthy, and more frequent deployments created vulnerability in this nation's homeland security? The most significant result of this project was the validation of the fact that the increased activation of reserves over the last decade has indeed had an impact on local law enforcement agencies and has caused them to use overtime to fill the gaps left by officers mobilized with their reserve units. This was validated by interviews with law enforcement agency administrators and existing surveys and poles completed in the last two years by the PERF, IACP, and National League of Cities. Unfortunately, the degrees to which these challenges have affected the nations homeland security were not discovered.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Intelligence Reform
On 22 July 2004 the 9/11 Commission released its report on the events surrounding the attacks of 11 September 2001. The 9/11 Report renewed calls for reform of the intelligence community (IC), continuing a long series of intelligence reform efforts that began shortly after the National Security Act of 1947 laid the foundation of the modern IC. As reform proceeds and government officials consider further changes, three topics remain relevant: (1) the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reform of the Department of Defense and its applicability to the IC, (2) the common findings and recommendations of past reform efforts of the IC, and (3) the competing interests inherent in the IC that influence the pace and character of actual reform. This study explores these topics in the context of the 9/11 Report and the subsequent reform efforts initiated by the executive and legislative branches. While there was common motivation between the latest effort to reform the IC and the earlier DOD reform effort as embodied in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it remains less clear if the measures taken in the DOD case are equally applicable to the IC. One reason to question the applicability of DOD reform efforts to the IC is the unique organizational context of the IC-an interagency organization supporting multiple departments as well as national policy makers. Reform of the IC is unlike reform of a single cabinet-level department, for at its most basic level the IC exists to enhance the effectiveness of multiple departments and senior policy makers in the accomplishment of their assigned functions. In short, the IC serves varied interests with sometimes shared and sometimes conflicting intelligence needs. This organizational context suggests that successful reform requires an on-going recalibration of competing interests to meet the changing demands inherent within a dynamic national security environment.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Redefining the Global War on Terrorism
This paper argues that the development and implementation of a counter-insurgency strategy that fully integrates all elements of national power is critical to success in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The paper discusses the flaws in declaring war on the method of terrorism rather than focusing on the actors or insurgents that use these methods. The paper analyzes Al-Qaida using the characteristics of successful insurgencies posed by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen in "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response." The analysis of the underlying social, economic and political conditions that support an insurgency, Al-Qaida's ideology, leadership and strategy, and the sources of support that enable an insurgency provide valuable insights in developing a strategy to defeat it. A review of the National Strategy for Countering Terrorism demonstrates an incongruence that limits its effectiveness as a blueprint for counterinsurgency. Recommendations include: the formation of a National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee to develop, implement and assess a counterinsurgency strategy integrating all aspects of national power; the reformation and revitalization of the executive branch, specifically the Department of State; and the development of military leaders with critical thinking skills and breadth of knowledge.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Joint Logistics Component Commander and the Mobility Air Forces
Though joint operations have been the hallmark of U.S. military doctrine for many years, a systematic study of joint logistics and the role of the U.S. Air Force has not been undertaken. This neglect has allowed a significant question to remain unanswered, specifically, Would the theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) benefit from a codified, doctrinally supported theater logistics commander? Moreover, no study has looked at this question from the unique perspective of the mobility air forces (MAF), and their role in joint theater leadership. This study grappled with the question of joint theater logistics command and control, especially from the MAF point of view. It looked at whether there can be a logistics component, if it could bring any benefit to the CINC, and finally, how the mobility air forces would be effected. A logistics component can exist: U.S. law allows a logistics component and doctrine supports its creation as an option for the CINC. OPERATIONS DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE and JOINT ENDEAVOR show that the U.S. has successfully used a theater logistics organization and that the concept works. These same examples also show how an ad hoc organization has serious shortfalls in the support it can provide. Current leadership is pursuing theater logistics implementation as shown by joint vision statements and the logistics plans of the various CINCs. A logistics component can bring benefits to the CINC. The JFLOGCC controls the logistics process from the theater and prevents any confusion about the requirements and priorities of the CINC.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Fighting Terrorism With Strategy
The end of the Cold War was an opportunity for the United States to select and adhere to a new grand strategy, but a new approach was never chosen because America did not face a threat of sufficient magnitude to make a choice necessary. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, some have argued that the age of strategic ambiguity known as the post-Cold War period is over, and the threat of international terrorism requires America to make a grand strategic choice. This paper examines those choices by presenting four post-Cold War strategy options--neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security and primacy--and examining them through a counterterrorism lens. Specifically, it employs a set of critical strategic questions about the war on terrorism and cites post-9-11 ideas from the proponents of each strategy to answer those questions. Based on those answers, each grand strategy is critiqued by applying a disciplined counterterrorism framework to the reveal tensions inherent in each approach. Finally, while the military cannot make grand strategy or force consistency in its application, it must be able to support it. To that end, this paper proposes capabilities that the United States Air Force (USAF) should enhance or acquire to support the war on terrorism depending on the grand strategy selected. This paper does not recommend a grand strategy or counterterrorism approach.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
